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Abstract. In this paper we analyse the security of two authenticated
group key agreement schemes based on the group key agreement protocol
of Burmester and Desmedt. One scheme was proposed by Burmester and
Desmedt, and uses a separate authentication scheme to achieve authen-
tication among the participants. We show that this scheme suffers from a
number of security vulnerabilities. The other scheme was generated using
the general protocol compiler of Katz and Yung. We show that in some
circumstances, even if key confirmation is implemented, this scheme still
suffers from insider attacks (which are not covered by the security model
used by Katz and Yung).
1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Diffie and Hellman [1], key agreement has become a
very active and fruitful research area in cryptography. The case of two-party key
agreement has been well investigated, and a variety of provably secure schemes
have been proposed (e.g., [2–4]). However, less attention has been given to group
key agreement, which enables more than two participants to negotiate a session
key. Of especial interest are authenticated group key agreement protocols, de-
signed for use in a hostile environment where communications are over open
networks which may be fully controlled by an adversary.
Of the existing group key agreement protocols, a number are based on the
idea of extending the two-party Diffie-Hellman protocol [1] to the group setting
(e.g., [5–10]). Among these schemes, the cyclic group key agreement protocol due
to Burmester and Desmedt (here referred to as the BD scheme) is particularly
efficient; it has been rigorously proved to be secure against a passive adversary
[11]. A number of authenticated group key agreement schemes based on the BD
scheme have been proposed, including those in [5, 12–16]. In this paper, we focus
on the enhanced BD scheme [5] and a scheme due to Katz and Yung [15], referred
to below as the KY scheme.
In the enhanced BD scheme, an interactive zero-knowledge proof scheme
is used to achieve authentication among the conference participants, while in
the KY scheme a signature mechanism is used to achieve authentication among
the conference participants. Both schemes are more efficient than the scheme
of Bresson et al. [17], which was the first authenticated group key agreement
scheme proved to be secure in a formal model.
The main contribution of this paper lies in analysing the security properties of
the BD scheme, and exhibiting potential security vulnerabilities in the enhanced
BD scheme and the KY scheme. The rest of this paper is organised as follows.
In section 2, we review three group key agreement schemes, namely the BD
scheme, the enhanced BD scheme, and the KY scheme. In section 3, we give our
observations on the security of these three schemes. In section 4, we conclude
this paper.
2 Review of the target schemes
In all three schemes, the following parameters are made public during the ini-
tialisation stage: G is a multiplicative group with large prime order q, and g is
a generator of G. We suppose all the potential participants and their identities
are from the set {(U1, IDU1), · · · , (Um, IDUm)}, where m is a sufficiently large
integer and IDUi (1 ≤ i ≤ n ≤ m) is the identity of Ui.
2.1 Description of the BD scheme
Suppose a set S = {U1, · · · , Un} (n ≤ m) of users wish to establish a session
key; then each user Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) performs the following steps. It should be
noted that the indices of users (and values exchanged between users) are taken
modulo n.
1. Ui chooses a random si (0 ≤ si < q), and broadcasts Zi = gsi .
2. After receiving Zi−1 and Zi+1, Ui computes and broadcasts Xi:
Xi = (Zi+1/Zi−1)si
3. After receiving every Xj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), Ui computes the session key Ki as:
Ki = (Zi−1)nsi · (Xi)n−1 · (Xi+1)n−2 · · ·Xi+n−2
= gnsi−1si · (g
sisi+1
gsi−1si
)n−1 · (g
si+1si+2
gsisi+1
)n−2 · · · g
si+n−2si+n−1
gsi+n−3si+n−2
= gsi−1si+sisi+1+si+1si+2+···+si+n−2si+n−1
= gs1s2+s2s3+s3s4+···+sns1
If all the participants are honest, then all of them will compute the same
session key because K1 = · · · = Kn. In [11], Burmester and Desmedt prove that
this scheme is secure against a passive adversary.
2.2 Description of the enhanced BD scheme
The enhanced BD scheme provides partial authentication for the protocol mes-
sages by using an authentication scheme which is secure against adaptive chosen
text attacks. The authentication scheme and the enhanced BD scheme operate
as follows.
The authentication scheme In the initialisation stage, the system selects four
large primes p2, p3, q2, q3 satisfying p2 ≤ q3, q2|(p2−1), and q3|(p3−1). Let g2 be
a generator of a multiplicative group of order q2 in Z∗p2 , and g3 be a generator of
a multiplicative group of order q3 in Z∗p3 . Each user Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in the system
publishes his public key {βi2, βi3, γi3}, where {βi2 = gai22 , βi3 = gai33 , γi3 = gbi33 },
and keeps {ai2, ai3, bi3} secret as his private key.
Suppose Ui wishes to prove knowledge of z to Uj (j 6= i); the authentication
scheme operates as follows. Ui sends z and γi2 = gbi22 to Uj , where bi2 is randomly
selected (0 ≤ bi2 ≤ g2). Simultaneously Ui proves to Uj that he knows the
discrete logarithm base g2 of βzi2γi2 and the discrete logarithm base g3 of β
γi2
i3 γi3,
using the zero-knowledge discrete logarithm proof scheme of Chaum et al. [18],
described below. Uj checks that γ
q2
i2 ≡ 1 (mod p2), gq22 ≡ βq2i2 ≡ 1 (mod p2),
gq33 ≡ βq3i3 ≡ γq3i3 (mod p3), that q2, q3 are primes, and that p2 ≤ q3. If any of
the checks fail, Uj terminates the protocol. Otherwise Uj now believes that Ui
knows z.
The Chaum et al. zero knowledge discrete logarithm proof scheme [18] oper-
ates as follows. Suppose P is a large prime, and that αx ≡ β (mod P ). Suppose
also that P, α, β are made public and x is a secret of Alice. If Alice wants to
prove her knowledge of x to Bob, she performs the following steps.
1. Alice selects T random numbers ei (0 ≤ ei < P − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ T ). Alice
computes and sends hi = αei mod P (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Bob.
2. Bob chooses and sends T random bits bi ∈ {0, 1} (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Alice.
3. For each bit bi (1 ≤ i ≤ T ), if bi = 0 Alice sets si = ei; otherwise Alice
computes si = ei − ej mod P − 1, where j is the minimal number for which
bj = 1. Finally, Alice sends (x− ej) mod P − 1 and si (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Bob.
4. For each bit i (1 ≤ i ≤ T ), if bi = 0 Bob checks αsi = hi; otherwise Bob
checks that αsi = hih−1j . Then Bob checks α
x−ej = βh−1j .
If all the checks succeed, Bob can confirm with a probability of 1− ( 12 )T that
Alice knows x [18].
Burmester and Desmedt [5] claim that the above scheme is a secure authen-
tication system, i.e., it has the following three security properties:
1. When only a passive adversary is present, Ui can successfully prove his knowl-
edge of z to Uj with an overwhelming probability.
2. If an attacker impersonates Ui, then Uj can detect it with an overwhelming
probability.
3. If an active attacker substitutes z with z′ (z 6= z′), then Uj will reject it with
an overwhelming probability.
The enhanced BD scheme Suppose a set S = {U1, · · · , Un} (n ≤ m) of users
wish to establish a session key; then each user Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) performs the
following steps. Note that the indices of users (and values exchanged between
users) are taken modulo n.
1. Ui chooses a random si (0 ≤ si ≤ q), and computes and broadcasts Zi = gsi .
2. After receiving Zi−1 and Zi+1, Ui proves his knowledge of si to Ui+1, and
verifies Ui−1’s knowledge of si−1.
If both the proof and the verification succeed, Ui computes and broadcasts
Xi:
Xi = (Zi+1/Zi−1)si
3. After receiving Xj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), Ui computes the session key Ki:
Ki = (Zi−1)nsi · (Xi)n−1 · (Xi+1)n−2 · · ·Xi+n−2
= gnsi−1si · (g
sisi+1
gsi−1si
)n−1 · (g
si+1si+2
gsisi+1
)n−2 · · · g
si+n−2si+n−1
gsi+n−3si+n−2
= gsi−1si+sisi+1+si+1si+2+···+si+n−2si+n−1
= gs1s2+s2s3+s3s4+···+sns1
If all the participants are honest, then all of them will compute the same
session key because K1 = · · · = Kn.
Burmester and Desmedt [5] claim that the enhanced BD scheme is a secure
key agreement scheme, i.e., in a protocol instance it is computationally infeasible
for any set of active attackers to compute the same session key as that which is
computed by the honest participants.
2.3 Description of the KY scheme
Katz and Yung [15] proposed a general protocol compiler that can transform
a group key agreement protocol secure against a passive adversary into an au-
thenticated group key agreement protocol secure against both passive and active
adversaries. As an example, Katz and Yung transformed the unauthenticated BD
scheme into an authenticated group key agreement protocol. Katz and Yung [15]
prove that this protocol is secure against an active adversary, i.e., the advantage
of any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) active adversary is negligible.
The KY scheme [15] requires that, during the initialisation stage, each user Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ m) generates a verification/signing key pair (PKUi , SKUi) by running
Gen(1k)1, where k is a security parameter. Suppose a set S = {U1, · · · , Un}
(n ≤ m) of users wish to establish a session key; then each user Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
performs the following steps. It should be noted that, as previously, the indices
of users (and values exchanged between users) are taken modulo n. Throughout
this paper, || represents the string concatenation operator.
1. Ui chooses a random ri (0 ≤ ri < q) and broadcasts IDUi , 0, and ri.
2. After receiving the broadcast messages from all other participants, Ui sets
noncei = ((IDU1 , r1), · · · , (IDUn , rn)) and stores it as part of its state infor-
mation2 .
1 We suppose that Σ = (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) is a signature scheme which is strongly
unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack (as defined in [15]).
2 If all the messages are transported correctly, every user will possess the same state
information.
Ui chooses a random number si (0 ≤ si < q) and computes Zi = gsi . Then
Ui computes the signature σi1 = SignSKUi (1||Zi||noncei) and broadcasts
IDUi , 1, Zi, and σi1.
3. When Ui receives the message IDUj , 1, Zj , and σj1 from user Uj (1 ≤
j ≤ n, j 6= i), he checks that: (1) Uj is an intended participant, (2) 1 is
the next expected sequence number for a message from Uj , and (3) σj1
is a valid signature, i.e. VrfyPKUj (1||Zj ||noncei, σj1) = 1, where an out-
put of 1 signifies acceptance. If any of these checks fail, Ui terminates the
protocol. Otherwise, Ui computes Xi = (Zi+1/Zi−1)si and the signature
σi2 = SignSKUi (2||Xi||noncei). Then Ui broadcasts IDUi , 2, Xi, and σi2.
4. When Ui receives the message IDUj , 2, Xj , and σj2 from user Uj (1 ≤ j ≤
n, j 6= i), he checks that: (1) Uj is an intended participant, (2) 2 is the next
expected sequence number for a message from Uj , and (3) σj2 is a valid
signature, i.e. VrfyPKUj (2||Xj ||noncei, σj2) = 1. If any of these checks fail,
Ui terminates the protocol. Then Ui computes the session key Ki:
Ki = (Zi−1)nsi · (Xi)n−1 · (Xi+1)n−2 · · ·Xi+n−2
= gnsi−1si · (g
sisi+1
gsi−1si
)n−1 · (g
si+1si+2
gsisi+1
)n−2 · · · g
si+n−2si+n−1
gsi+n−3si+n−2
= gsi−1si+sisi+1+si+1si+2+···+si+n−2si+n−1
= gs1s2+s2s3+s3s4+···+sns1
If all the participants are honest, then all of them will compute the same
session key K = K1 = · · · = Kn = gs1s2+s2s3+···+sns1 .
Katz and Yung [15] also proposed the following method (without security
proof) to achieve key confirmation for the authenticated group key agreement
scheme: after computing key K, each player Ui computes xi = FK(IDUi),
signs xi, and broadcasts xi and the corresponding signature, where F repre-
sents a pseudo-random function. However, they did not specify how the sig-
nature is computed. In this paper, we suppose the signature is computed as
σij = SignSKUi (xi), where j is the next round number.
However, it should be noted that a different key confirmation method is
proposed in the full version of [15], and this method is proved to be secure in a
different security model in [19].
3 Properties of the target schemes
In this section we first describe certain security properties of the BD scheme,
and then demonstrate security vulnerabilities in both the enhanced BD scheme
and the KY scheme.
3.1 Security properties of the BD scheme
In the BD scheme, a malicious participant, say Uj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), who can manip-
ulate the communications in the network, is able to make any other participant,
say Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= j), compute the session key to be any value K∗ ∈ G
chosen by Uj .
To achieve this, in the second step Uj intercepts the message Xi−n+2 and
prevents it from reaching Ui. Uj then waits until all the other messages have
been received and computes the session key K in the normal way, i.e. as in step
3 of section 2.1. Uj now sends X ′i+n−2 = Xi+n−2 · K
∗
K to Ui, pretending that it
comes from Ui+n−2.
Lemma 1. As a result of the above attack, Ui will compute the session key as
K∗.
Proof. This is immediate, since Ui will compute the session key as K · X
′
i+n−2
Xi+n−2
=
K∗, by definition of X ′i+n−2.
In summary, in the BD scheme any participant capable of manipulating the
messages received by another participant can completely control the value of the
session key obtained by that participant. In the following subsections, we show
that this property means that schemes derived from the BD scheme possess
certain security vulnerabilities.
3.2 Security vulnerabilities in the enhanced BD scheme
The enhanced BD scheme suffers from the following potential security vulnera-
bilities.
Man-in-the-middle attack To mount a man-in-the-middle attack, an active
adversary proceeds as follows. In the first step of the protocol the adversary
replaces the message Zi+1 sent to Ui with Z ′i+1 = Z
2
i−1, for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Then we can prove that the protocol will end successfully and the adversary can
compute the session key held by Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Lemma 2. Under the above attack, the protocol will end successfully, and the
adversary can compute the session key held by Ui for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Proof. Under the attack, it is clear that the protocol will end successfully, be-
cause it is only required that Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) proves his knowledge of si to Ui+1
(while the adversary only changes the message that Ui+1 sends to Ui).
It is also clear that, in the second step, Ui will broadcastXi = (Z ′i+1/Zi−1)
si =
(Zi−1)si . Then, after intercepting all the broadcast values Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the
adversary can compute the session key held by Ui as
Ki = (Zi−1)nsi · (Xi)n−1 · (Xi+1)n−2 · · ·Xi+n−2
= (Xi)n · (Xi)n−1 · (Xi+1)n−2 · · ·Xi+n−2
which involves only values broadcast by the various recipients. The result follows.
Insider different key attack In the enhanced BD scheme, it is only required
that Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) proves his knowledge of si to Ui+1. The authentication
requirement can successfully prevent a malicious attacker from impersonating
Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to send a forged message Zi to the honest participant Ui+1.
However, a malicious participant, say Uj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), who can manipulate the
communications in the network, is still able to make any other participant, say
Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= j), compute the session key to be any value K∗ ∈ G.
In fact, any active outsider attacker can also mount such an attack by ma-
nipulating Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in step 2 of the protocol run, but the attacker cannot
obtain any information about the session keys obtained by the legitimate par-
ticipants.
Outsider impersonation attack An outsider attacker can also impersonate a
valid participant, Ui say, in some circumstances, but the attacker cannot obtain
the session key. This attack is based on the following security vulnerability in the
Chaum et al. zero-knowledge discrete logarithm proof scheme3. The vulnerability
arises from the fact that proof scheme does not enable the prover to specify the
verifier.
Suppose Alice wishes to prove her knowledge of x to Bob, then an attacker
can concurrently impersonate Alice to prove knowledge of x to any other entity,
Carol say. The attack can be mounted as follows.
1. Alice selects T random numbers ei (0 ≤ ei ≤ P−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ T ), and computes
and sends hi = αei mod P (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Bob.
The attacker intercepts the message, prevents it from reaching Bob, and
forwards hi = αei mod P (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Carol pretending to be Alice (i.e.
starting a second run of the protocol).
2. Carol chooses and sends random bits ei ∈ {0, 1} (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to the attacker
as part of the second protocol run. The attacker then impersonates Bob to
forward ei ∈ {0, 1} (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Alice as the second message of the first
protocol run.
3. For each bit bi (1 ≤ i ≤ T ), if bi = 0 Alice sets si = ei; otherwise Alice
computes si = ei−ej mod P − 1, where j is the minimal number that bj = 1.
Alice sends x−ej and si (1 ≤ i ≤ T ) to Bob as the third message of the first
protocol run. The attacker intercepts the message, prevents it from reaching
Bob, and forwards it to Carol as the third message of the second protocol
run.
4. For each bit i (1 ≤ i ≤ T ), if bi = 0 Carol checks αsi = hi; otherwise Carol
checks that αsi = hih−1j . Then Carol checks that α
x−ej = βh−1j .
It is easy to verify that Carol’s checks will succeed and confirm that the
attacker knows x. This attack conflicts with the claim made in [5] that the
authentication technique is secure against any type of attack.
3 It should be noted that this vulnerability exists not only in this specific scheme, but
also exists in all such schemes with only a one-way proof of knowledge.
We now show how to use the above observation to attack the enhanced
BD scheme. Suppose the attacker detects that a set S = {U1, · · · , Un} of users
is starting the key agreement protocol to negotiate a session key (referred to
below as the first protocol instance). The attacker impersonates Ui to initiate
a second instance of the key agreement protocol among a different set S′ =
{U ′1, U ′2, . . . , U ′n′} of users, where U ′i = Ui. In these two protocol instances, the
attacker performs the following steps.
1. In the first protocol instance, Ui chooses a random si (0 ≤ si < q), and
computes and broadcasts Zi = gsi . The attacker intercepts the messages
from both Ui−1 and Ui+1 to Ui and prevents them from reaching Ui.
In the second protocol instance, the attacker impersonates Ui to broadcast
Zi = gsi . Other participants perform as required by the protocol. Suppose
the messages sent by U ′i−1 and U
′
i+1 are Z
′
i−1 and Z
′
i+1.
The attacker impersonates Ui−1 and Ui+1 to send Z ′i−1 and Z
′
i+1 to Ui in
the first protocol instance.
2. In the first protocol instance, when Ui proves his knowledge of si to Ui+1, the
attacker mounts the above attack against the Chaum et al. zero-knowledge
discrete logarithm proof scheme by impersonating Ui to prove his knowledge
of si to U ′i+1 in the second protocol instance.
In the second protocol instance, when U ′i−1 proves his knowledge of s
′
i−1 to
the attacker, the attacker mounts the above attack against the Chaum et al.
zero-knowledge discrete logarithm proof scheme by impersonating U ′i−1 to
prove U ′i−1’s knowledge of s
′
i−1 to Ui in the first protocol instance.
In the first protocol instance Ui computes and broadcasts Xi as:
Xi = (Z ′i+1/Z
′
i−1)
si
The attacker intercepts this message and impersonates Ui to broadcast the
same message in the second protocol instance.
3. In the second protocol instance, the users U ′j (1 ≤ j ≤ n′, j 6= i) computes
the common session key. However, the attacker cannot compute the session
key because he does not know si.
The first instance will be terminated because the authentication messages
between Ui and Ui+1 are blocked by the attacker.
In the second protocol instance, the attacker succeeds in impersonating Ui
to the members of the set S′.
Insider impersonation attack In the above attack, suppose that the attacker
is a legitimate participant in the second protocol instance, i.e. suppose that the
attacker is U ′j in the set S
′ (U ′j is not required to be a member of the set S). Then
U ′j can successfully impersonate Ui in the second protocol instance without any
knowledge of the secret key of Ui. In this case, it is clear that U ′j can compute the
session key agreed by all the participants of S′, since U ′j is a legitimate member
of S′.
This attack means that, even if authentication is implemented, a malicious
participant can still impersonate another honest participant in a protocol in-
stance.
3.3 Potential security vulnerability in the KY scheme
We show that the KY scheme suffers from insider different key attacks even if
key confirmation is implemented. Specifically, we show that any n− 2 malicious
participants can make the other honest participants compute different keys at
the end of the protocol. However, it should be noted that insider attacks are
not covered by the security model in [15]. Recently, insider attacks have been
modelled by Katz and Shin in [19].
For simplicity we describe the attack in three-party case. Suppose, in some
past successful instance of the KY protocol among {U1, U2, U3}, the key con-
firmation message sent by U3 is x∗3 = FK∗3 (IDU3) and σ
∗
33 = SignSKU3 (x
∗
3). U2
can initiate a new instance of the KY protocol among {U1, U2, U3} and mount
a different key attack as follows.
1. Each user Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) begins by choosing a random ri (0 ≤ ri < q) and
broadcasting IDUi , 0, and ri.
2. After receiving the initial broadcast messages, Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) sets noncei =
((IDU1 , r1), (IDU2 , r2), (IDU3 , r3)) and stores it as part of its state informa-
tion. Then Ui chooses a random si (0 ≤ si < q), computes Zi = gsi and the
signature σi1 = SignSKUi (1||Zi||noncei), and then broadcasts IDUi , 1, Zi,
and σi1.
3. When Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) receives the messages from other participants, he
checks the messages as required by the protocol. It is easy to verify that all
the checks will succeed.
U1 computes and then broadcasts IDU1 , 2, X1, and σ12,where
X1 = (Z2/Z3)s1 , σ12 = SignSKU1 (2||X1||nonce1).
U3 computes and then broadcasts IDU3 , 2, X3, and σ32, where
X3 = (Z1/Z2)r3 , σ32 = SignSKU3 (2||X3||nonce3)
U2 computes and sends IDU2 , 2, X2, and σ22 to U3, where
X2 = (Z3/Z1)s2 , σ22 = SignSKU2 (2||X2||nonce2)
U2 then waits until all the other messages have been received and computes
the session key K in the normal way, i.e. as in step 3 of section 2.1. U2 now
sends IDU2 , 2, X
′
2, and σ
′
22 to U1, where
X ′2 = X2 ·
K∗3
K
, σ′22 = SignSKU2 (2||X ′2||nonce2)
Lemma 3. As a result of the above steps, U1 will compute the session key
as K∗3 , and U3 will compute the session key as K.
Proof. This is immediate, since U1 will compute the session key as K∗3 =
(Z3)3s1(X1)2X ′2 = K · K
∗
3
K , and U3 will compute the session key as K =
(Z2)3s3(X3)2X1.
Hence, as a result, U2 shares the session keys K∗3 and K (K 6= K∗3 ) with U1
and U3 respectively.
4. U2 intercepts the confirmation messages between U1 and U3 and prevents
them from reaching their indeed destinations. U2 computes and sends the
confirmation messages x′2 = FK∗3 (IDU2) and σ
′
23 = SignSKU2 (x
′
2) to U1,
and then sends x2 = FK(IDU2) and σ23 = SignSKU2 (x2) to U3. Then U2
impersonates U3 to send x∗33 and σ
∗
33 to U1.
U2 initiates a second instance of the key agreement protocol among the
members of a set S
′′
, which includes U1 and U2. In step 3 of the new instance,
U2 manipulates the communications and forces U1 to compute the session
key asK, and then obtains the confirmation message (x1 = FK(IDU1), σ13 =
SignSKU1 (x1)) from U1.
U2 impersonates U1 to forward (x1 = FK(IDU1), σ13 = SignSKU1 (x1)) to
U3 in the current protocol instance.
5. It is easy to verify that all the key confirmation messages will be checked
successfully by the various participants, and the attack will therefore succeed.
It is clear that this security vulnerability can be removed if every user Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ 3) is required to compute his key confirmation message as xi =
FK(IDUi), σi3 = SignSKUi (3||xi||noncei)).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a number of security vulnerabilities exist
in both the enhanced BD scheme and the KY scheme. In particular, we have
shown that in the enhanced BD scheme the implementation of the authentica-
tion scheme does not meet the authentication requirement specified in [5]. One
possible way of removing the vulnerabilities in the enhanced BD scheme would
be to authenticate each message using a digital signature, as in the KY scheme.
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